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Abstract
Due to the current political challenges facing democratic societies, including an apparent presence of
populist rhetoric, the question of how political discussions should take place in democratic education
is as urgent as ever. In the last two decades, one of the most prominent approaches to this question has
been the use of deliberative theory. However, the deliberative approach has been criticized from an
agonistic perspective for neglecting the role of emotions in political discussions. Deliberative theorists have in turn responded to this critique and argued that the agonistic approach tends to put too
much emphasis on students’ emotions and identities in political discussions. Recently, as a contribution to this debate, the idea of assimilating agonism with deliberation has been suggested as a way of
overcoming the differences between agonism and deliberative theory.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the educational debate between agonism and deliberative theory by exploring the deliberative critique from the vantage point of agonism. I claim that
the deliberative critique of agonism is unfounded and based on a misreading of Mouffe’s agonistic
theory. Furthermore, I argue that the attempt to assimilate agonism with deliberation is not compatible with Mouffe’s agonistic theory.
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f schools aim to educate students to become active
democratic citizens, we need to ask what kind of experiences political discussions in the classroom should provide
students with. When students discuss a political issue in the
classroom setting, where different and conflicting opinions about
their common future may clash, what should be in the foreground?
For instance, should the teacher aim to establish a communicative
situation where the goal is to reach a collective will-formation, or
should he or she aim to highlight yet maintain the differences and
conflictual aspects of the students’ claims and opinions?
Furthermore, what role should the students’ identities and emotions play in these political discussions?
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

In the research field of citizenship education, the question of
how political and controversial issues can (and should) take place
in the classroom has been of great interest for educational scholars
(see Hess, 2009; Ruitenberg, 2009; Samuelsson, 2016). Political
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discussions among students in the classroom have been highlighted by leading scholars as being of vital importance, not only
for a democratic education, but also for a democratic society (see
Hess, 2009; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 359). The paper takes
its starting point in this scholarly discussion and focuses on the
normative question of what the guiding principles for political
discussions in citizenship education should be. In the last two
decades, one of the most prominent approaches to this question
has been the use of deliberative theory (see Samuelsson & Bøyum,
2015, p. 77; see also McAvoy & Hess, 2013; Roth, 2006). From the
perspective of deliberative theory, critique has been directed
toward what can be seen as an alternative ideal for political
discussions in the classroom, namely, the agonistic ideal.
In short, the deliberative ideal and the agonistic ideal promote
different views of classroom discussions. The deliberative ideal
emphasizes that a classroom discussion should establish a communicative situation in which different opinions can meet and
confront each other in a respectful way. Furthermore, the deliberative ideal underlines that even though a conflict can be a starting
point for a discussion, the aim should be to transcend differences
and conflicts. In other words, the participants in the discussion
should aim towards some form of collective will-formation
(Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015).
The agonistic ideal, on the other hand, emphasizes the
political dimension of conflicts between different opinions and
visions of society. This means that conflicts between opinions
cannot be reduced to rational deliberation but are bound up with
the participants’ identities and emotions (see Ruitenberg, 2009;
Zembylas, 2011). From an agonistic perspective, a collective
will-formation should be understood in terms of hegemony rather
than as rational consensus (Gürsözlü, 2009).
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the educational
debate between agonism and deliberative theory by exploring the
deliberative critique from the vantage point of agonism. I critically
explore two arguments against the agonistic ideal and the idea of
assimilating agonism with deliberation. I claim that the deliberative critique of agonism, concerning identities and emotions in
education, is unfounded and based on a misreading of Mouffe’s
(2005) agonistic theory.
The first argument to be explored is the role of students’
identities when discussing political issues in the classroom. The
argument is that the agonistic ideal puts too much emphasis on
identities and less on the political issue itself. The second argument
concerns the role of emotions in classroom discussions and
states that when the agonistic ideal brings emotions into classroom discussions, it can prevent students openly and constructively discussing the political problems and issues they are facing.
Furthermore, the idea of assimilating agonism with deliberation in
education is explored against the background of previous attempts
at similar assimilations in the field of political theory (see Khan,
2013; Knops, 2007; Markell, 1997).
First, some of the ways in which deliberative theorists have
discussed and handled the role of emotions in education are
outlined. Second, agonistic theory and key issues concerning the
role of emotions in an agonistic approach to citizenship education
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

are presented. Finally, and in three succeeding sections, the
deliberative critique of agonistic education and the attempt to
assimilate agonism with deliberation are explored.

Deliberative Education and the Role of Emotions
In the field of education, the deliberative perspective is not a single
body of coherent principles but consists of different ideas about
what should characterize deliberation (Samuelsson & Bøyum,
2015). Thus, educational scholars advocating a deliberative
approach in education emphasize different aspects of deliberation.
For example, Peterson (2009) has underlined the role of civic
listening, empathy, and internal reflection, while Gutmann (1987)
has emphasized deliberation in relation to a democratic society
and formulated it as a condition for citizens’ conscious social
reproduction. From Gutmann’s perspective, one of the aims of
education is to facilitate democratic virtue in terms of “the ability
to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social reproduction” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 46). However, Roth (2000) has
criticized Gutmann’s notion of “conscious social reproduction” as
being too deterministic and instead has formulated deliberation in
terms of “cultural mediation,” where communication is oriented
toward intersubjective understanding (Roth, 2000, pp. 88–89).
In a literature review of the field of deliberative education,
Samuelsson & Bøyum (2015) identified two main strands in the
theoretically oriented studies of deliberative education. One strand
articulates the deliberative ideal as political decision-making and
draws mainly on the works of Habermas and Gutmann. The other
focuses on deliberation as a way of life, where deliberation is related
to the way in which people can morally live together. The latter
conception of deliberation draws more on the works of Dewey.
However, some general points of agreement can be identified in the
deliberative ideal (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015; Samuelsson, 2016).
One is the importance of enabling diverse opinions and participants being able to change their minds about the issue at stake
(Hanson & Howe, 2011; Parker, 2011). A second is that participants
listen to each other and that each participant is treated with
respect. A third issue that the strands agree on is that the discussion should aim toward some form of collective will-formation,
that is, that the deliberation is in some way directed toward the
participants’ collective agreement (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015).
I will now turn to the question of how the role of emotions has
been handled in deliberative theory. First, I describe the critique
that stems from agonistic theory and how deliberative theory
handles the role of emotions in classroom discussions. Here, the
word emotions is used synonymously with passions. In the passages
in which passions is used, rather than emotions, it reflects other
authors’ arguments. However, using the term emotions in relation
to Mouffe’s agonistic theory is problematic, because Mouffe makes
a conceptual distinction between emotions and passions and states
that she theorizes passions. She uses the term passion because, as
she puts it, “it allows me to underline the dimension of conflict and
to suggest a confrontation between collective political identities,
two aspects that I take to be constitutive of politics” (Mouffe, 2014,
p. 149). Ruitenberg (2009), however, has formulated emotions as a
central concept in relation to the agonistic approach to citizenship
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education. As the analysis in this paper draws on the educational
take on agonistic theory and Ruitenberg’s distinction between
political and moral emotions, the term emotions is used most and
no conceptual distinction is made between emotions and passions.
The agonistic critique of the role of emotions in deliberative
theory is captured in Ruitenberg’s wording “that liberal deliberative approaches to democracy, in their emphasis on reason, have
underestimated the importance of the emotions” (Ruitenberg,
2009, p. 273). Similarly, the agonistic critique of how deliberative
theory fails to recognize the central role of emotions in politics and
political discussions has been responded to by scholars advocating
deliberation, thereby turning it into a vibrant and ongoing
conversation. One response to the critique is that it is based on
misconceptions about deliberative theory. Samuelsson & Bøyum
(2015) have pointed out that a deliberative response has been that
“no major deliberative theorist has ever held that deliberators
should rely on pure reason alone and avoid all appeals to emotion”
(p. 83). Another response to the agonistic critique comes from
deliberative theorist Dryzek (2005), who stresses that the concept
of communication is wider than reason and rational argumentation. Dryzek has maintained that deliberative communication
comes in many forms, such as “rhetoric, testimony, performance,
gossip, and jokes” (p. 224). Nonetheless, the role of emotions is a
debated issue in deliberative theory (Samuelsson, 2016).
The strategies for dealing with the question of emotions in
deliberative theory follow different routes. Also, the critique not
only stems from agonistic theory but also from the deliberative
approach itself. From a deliberative perspective, Griffin (2012) has
argued that Gutmann & Thompson “defend an instrumental
understanding of passion as potentially intelligent tool for the
deliberative citizen” (p. 522) and that “their understanding of the
role of emotions remains unsatisfactory because ‘they continue to
conceive of deliberation exclusively in terms of reason’” (ibid.,
citing Hall). In turn, Griffin (2012) argued for a deliberative
education that aims toward educating “emotional intelligent
deliberative citizens” (p. 533), where students learn to handle and
understand their own emotions. In the discussion of which role
emotions/passions should play in political discussions in the
classroom, Englund (2016) has formulated a position that places
passions in the background without downplaying the importance
of students’ commitment to deliberate. A further way of dealing
with the role of emotions in deliberative education can be found in
Samuelsson’s (2016) idea of gradually introducing controversial
and emotionally charged topics into the classroom. As I read
Samuelsson, the idea is that the teacher first needs to establish a
“deliberative communicative pattern” (p. 7) in the classroom,
where students can develop and improve their skills to deliberate
with each other. Then, once such a communication pattern is
established, and students have improved their deliberating skills,
more emotionally charged topics can be discussed in the
classroom.
Ideas like those of Griffin, Englund, and Samuelsson can be
considered different ways in which contemporary deliberative
theory addresses the critique that emotions are underestimated in
deliberative theory. I return to the role of emotions in deliberative
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

theory later, after first outlining the agonistic position on emotion
and identity in the field of citizenship education.

Agonistic Education and the Role of Emotions
Drawing on Mouffe’s (2005) theory of agonistic pluralism,
Ruitenberg (2009) outlines an agonistic approach in which she
highlights the importance of enabling political emotions in
classrooms. According to Ruitenberg, political emotions can be
considered an essential aspect of political and democratic life.
Thus, in educating students as democratic and political adversaries, political emotions need to have a legitimate place in citizenship
education. The role of emotions as a vital component of an
agonistic education is also stressed by Sund & Öhman (2014):
“Passion has a political dimension that is important to emphasise
in education, especially when consensus-oriented approaches in
education run the risk of falling short in terms of acknowledging
the political” (p. 654). In defining political emotions, Ruitenberg
makes a distinction between political and moral emotions.
Whereas political emotions are directed toward a societal object,
such as homelessness, a moral emotion is directed toward a
personal, or interpersonal, object. An example of a moral emotion
is anger about “one’s cheating brother’s moral transgression”
(Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 277). In a classroom discussion about a political issue, it is political emotions and not moral emotions that
should be given a legitimate place. In the agonistic approach,
conflicts in classrooms are considered in terms of not only
problems that need to be “handled” by the teacher but also as
unavoidable aspects of a democratic life together with others
(see Todd, 2010). Ruitenberg highlights the need for political
disputes to remain political without being reduced to personal
conflicts between students or to a “debate competition.” In contrast
to personal conflicts and competing debate teams, political
disputes can be understood in terms of “confrontations in the
public sphere of arguments for ‘clearly differentiated democratic
positions’” (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 278, citing Mouffe). Such confrontations are clearly not person-oriented, but are bound up with
substantially different visions of what a just society is and how it
should be achieved. In that sense, “the other” becomes a legitimate
political adversary rather than a mere debate competitor. This
approach to conflicts can be understood in terms of enabling
students to see that the lines between “us” and “them” are
changeable and can be redefined. Or, as Todd (2009) formulates
the educational process of reframing conflicts, it could be understood as:
helping students to reframe expressions of conflict as constituting we/
they relations—relations which are continually shifting and
contingent—and to help them recognize that the point is not to win
the argument, or to eschew the passions of others, but to live in that
fragile and unstable space of “conflictual consensus.” (p. 114)

A central aspect in this agonistic education is the destabilization of
essentialist identities that can open up for politically formulated
identities that are compatible with democracy. In other words, it is
about enabling identities that are bound up with different visions
of liberty and equality, rather than identities that revolve around
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essentially fixed conceptions of who “we” and “they” are. Destabilizing the frontiers between “us” and “them” and changing essentialistically drawn lines into politically articulated differences is the
transformation of the enemy into the adversary. It is thus this
transformation of antagonism into agonism that lies at the heart of
agonistic education. Zembylas (2011) highlights what the move
from an essentialist understanding of identities can mean in
education and argues that “an agonistic democracy in citizenship education embraces plural belongings, not in essentialist
terms but rather in contingent ones. This means . . . a refocusing of
the emphasis from social engagement on the basis of ethnic
identities to that of political engagement . . .” (p. 64). Focusing on
identity and belonging as interrelated with political engagement,
rather than grounded in essentialist identities, could also be
a suitable precondition for acknowledging students as political
subjects “here and now” and not just as citizens “to be.” Seeing
students as “already” political subjects, with an opportunity
to signify their own visions and hopes in political terms, could be
contrasted with the view in which their perceived essentialist
identity prescribes them with political claims (Todd, 2010).
To sum up, the agonistic approach that takes shape from these
outlines highlights the importance of sustaining the political in
emotions, conflicts, and identities. It is an approach that aims to
make room for political subjectivity as a contingent and open
endeavour. The next section focuses on two arguments against
agonistic education and explores the idea of assimilating agonism
with deliberation.

Identity or Issue: What Should the Conflict Be About?
The first argument to be explored is the relation between identities
and political issues in classroom discussions. The deliberative
critique of agonism highlights that the agonistic approach places
students’ identities in focus, rather than the political issue itself. By
doing this, conflicts can easily become clashes between individuals,
rather than between political ideals or perspectives. A main
difference between deliberation and agonism is that “deliberation
brings into focus the conflict, the problem, and the different views
on a particular substantive issue, while agonism focuses, rather, on
the different (often ethnic) identities of the persons/adversaries
involved, not on the problem (whatever it is) itself ” (Englund,
2016, p. 69).
As I understand this argument, the idea is that by placing an
issue in the foreground of the discussion, rather than identity, the
more nuanced and dynamic the discussion will become. Characterizing deliberation in the public sphere, Dryzek (2005) highlights
that it is reasonable to believe that the more emphasis that is put on
the identity of the communicating participants, the more difficult
it will be for them to change their minds about the issue in question. In other words, it is difficult to change your mind about an
issue “if one’s position is tied to one’s identity” (Dryzek, 2005,
p. 229). In relation to classroom discussions, the argument is that if
students are encouraged to openly discuss an issue, rather than
encounter each other from the vantage point of their identity, they
will be better suited to meet and solve the political issues they are
facing. From this perspective, a deliberative approach to classroom
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

discussions seems to be more in line with a citizenship education
that fosters mutual respect between citizens than the agonistic
approach. Englund (2016) expresses it like this:
I believe that focusing on personal identities is likely to lead to
struggles between individuals, and that views built into and deeply
rooted in identities make rational deliberation over the problem itself,
and a shared effort to define the problem, more difficult. (p. 69)

Thus, when identity is in focus, it risks foreclosing the possibilities
of rational deliberation by creating conflicts between individuals,
instead of enabling the problem itself to enter the foreground.
Dryzek (2005) argues that one potential of deliberation is that it
aims toward transcending identity-based conflicts by linking
identities to more general principles of humanity. In this way,
conflicts do not have to stay identity-based or be framed in
essentialist terms, even if they started out as such, but instead have
the potential to move beyond this point and open up for constructive reconciliation.
How should the critique that agonism is too oriented toward
students’ identities be understood? Should the emphasis on
identities in the agonistic approach be understood as one that
moves the focus away from the political issue itself? As I see it, the
deliberative critique rests on two unfounded and erroneous claims
about the agonistic conception of identities. First, the critique
assumes that a focus on students’ identities substantially differs
from a focus on the issue itself. Thus, the critique presupposes that
a sharp distinction between identities and political issues can be
maintained (cf. Ljunggren, 2010). Second, the critique assumes
that the agonistic approach embraces essentialist identity-
formations, such as ethnic identities. However, the deliberative
critique effectively points to how this aspect of the agonistic
approach needs theoretical clarification in relation to education.
To explore this critique further, I turn to the agonistic conception
of identity.
From an agonistic perspective, the conflicts between identities formulated in essentialist terms are highly problematic. Such
conflicts, where the other is an enemy to be attacked rather than an
adversary to defeat in the realm of politics, need to be handled
within the institutions of society. On this point, agonistic and
deliberative theorists seem to agree that conflicts between identities that are formulated in essentialist terms need to be avoided.
However, what they disagree on is how such conflicts should be
avoided. Englund and Dryzek have suggested deemphasizing and
moving beyond identity positions in political discussions, whereas
Ruitenberg and Mouffe would prefer to enable alternative collective identities, that is, identities that are not formulated in essentialist terms.
The starting point for the agonistic approach to citizenship
education is that some formations of collective identities will take
shape in the classroom regardless of whether or not they are
recognized by the teacher. Consequently, the focus from an
agonistic perspective is the enabling of identity formations that are
compatible with democracy. Defining which identity formations
are compatible with democracy depends on the distinction
between agonism and antagonism. This means that identity
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formations that frame “the other” as an enemy, rather than an
adversary, are not compatible with democracy. Where “the other”
is framed as an adversary, the conflict between “us” and “them”
stems from substantially different visions about what a just society
is, rather than from ideas about the other’s essential traits. In
outlining what agonism could imply in citizenship education,
Zembylas (2011) writes: “Undoubtedly, the encounter with the
other, as Schaap asserts, is always conditioned by the interpretive
framework (or identity) we bring to it; however, this does not imply
that certain ethnic or other identities should become hegemonic or
reified [emphasis added]” (pp. 62–63). In other words, the agonistic
approach could be understood as one in which identity matters,
but where not every identity formation is desirable.
Mouffe (2005) highlights that if agonistic collective identities
are not enabled by societal institutions, there is a risk that conflicts
will be played out in an essentialist register, where the other is seen
as an enemy rather than an adversary:

classroom discussion. This critique is explored further in the next
section.

If this adversarial configuration is missing, passions cannot be given a
democratic outlet and the agonistic dynamics of pluralism are
hindered. The danger arises that the democratic confrontation will
therefore be replaced by a confrontation between essentialist forms of
identification or non-negotiable moral values. (p. 30)

[I]dentity-based discussions, which are different from deliberation
with a focus on a substantive problem, also tend to bring passion into
the discussion (a point also explicitly underlined in agonism, when it
says that deliberative theorists underestimate the emotions)—a
passion which I think a deliberative approach would frequently be
hesitant to promote. (Englund, 2016, p. 69)

Thus, the deliberative critique of how agonism emphasizes
identities is unfounded in its assertion that this is an emphasis on
essentialist identities. On the contrary, it is precisely these forms of
identifications that the agonistic approach aims to counter. From
the perspective of agonistic theory, it is the lack of adversarial
relations that can enable the growth of identities in essentialist
terms, such as ethnic identities. The agonistic approach draws
instead on an understanding of identities in terms of plural and
contingent belongings (Zembylas, 2011, p. 64).
To sum up, the focus of the agonistic approach is not essentialist identities. On the contrary, the agonistic approach places the
confrontation between substantially different visions of society in
the foreground. It is an approach that puts the political issue in
focus, but in contrast to the deliberative approach, where the role
of identities is placed in the background, it aims to enable collective
identities to be shaped by different political visions of society (see
Mouffe, 2005, pp. 29–31).
As I see it, the agonistic approach highlights the close
interplay between identities and political issues by emphasizing the
importance of collective identities in political discussions.
Consequently, the main difference between the deliberative
approach and the agonistic approach is not whether the political
issue or political identity should be in focus but whether a relation
between identities and political issues should be taken into account
in citizenship education. This is an aspect that does not seem to be
acknowledged by the deliberative approach in its critique of
agonism.
One way of exploring the relation between identity and issue
further is through the concept of political emotions, emotions that
are directed toward social and political issues. However, the
agonistic approach has been criticized from a deliberative perspective for putting too much emphasis on the role of emotions in
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

Is There Room for Political Emotions in the Classroom?
From an agonistic perspective, emotions are an integrated aspect of
political and democratic life. It is therefore not surprising that an
agonistic approach to citizenship education emphasizes the vital
role of emotions in political classroom discussions.
From a deliberative stance, emotions in political discussion
are risky. As indicated above, deliberative theory handles this risk
in different ways (see Englund, 2016; Griffin, 2012; Samuelsson,
2016). One risk with bringing emotions into political discussions is
that they can transform conflict between political positions into
conflicts between individuals. In identity-based discussions,
emotions can play a key role in such a transformation. Bringing
emotions into identity-based classroom discussions is therefore at
odds with the deliberative ideal.

From a deliberative perspective, emotions in political discussions
should be handled and controlled by the teacher and the students
together. However, as Englund (2016) points out, these kinds of
emotions should not be confused with commitment:
I believe that, from a deliberative point of view, passion in the
classroom should, if possible, be interactively controlled and nuanced
by both the teacher and the students (or at least efforts made in that
direction), while still leaving room for commitment in the
argumentative process. (p. 69)

The argument should not be interpreted as a total rejection of
emotions in the classroom. Rather, it is the task of the teacher to
analyze the classroom situation. Even though emotions, especially
in identity-based discussions, are hazardous, Englund (2016)
argues that: “There are of course occasions where passion has to be
brought in, if the school class is indifferent towards touching on
problems and conflicting views” (p. 73). In other words, emotions
should not be fuelled or emphasized by the teacher when students
are discussing political issues in the classroom, except in certain
situations where there is widespread indifference among the
students. Consequently, according to the deliberative critique, a
problem with the agonistic approach is that the emphasis on
emotions in agonism tends to constrain the potential of the
communicative situations in the classroom by moving the focus
away from the political issue itself towards students’ different
identities. Such a move risks transforming conflicts over a political
issue into personal conflicts between students (see Englund, 2016,
p. 69).
To explore this argument, it is important to highlight how the
agonistic understanding of emotions that Ruitenberg (2009) and
other agonistic-oriented educational scholars formulate is not a
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valid target for the deliberative critique. As indicated above,
Ruitenberg (2009) has defined political emotions as emotions
directed toward societal issues, such as homelessness, and moral
emotions as being directed towards personal or interpersonal
issues (cf. White, 2012, pp. 2–3). The essential difference between
the two kinds of emotions is that they are directed toward different
kind of objects. Accordingly, Ruitenberg argues that they should
not be seen as equally relevant in classroom discussions but that it
is the political emotions that should have a given place in classroom discussions. With this distinction in the foreground, the
argument from deliberative theory becomes problematic. The core
of this argument is that by bringing emotions into the classroom,
conflicts will become personal between students, which is undesirable. Instead, the focus should be on the political issue itself. This
argument would be decisive if the agonistic approach embraced
moral emotions as relevant for political discussions in the classroom. However, when it comes to embracing political emotions
that are directed toward social relations and issues, the deliberative
argument does not seem to undermine the agonistic approach. On
the contrary, both Ruitenberg (2009) and Englund (2016) seem to
agree that it is a problem if emotions in a classroom discussion
become person-oriented. Ruitenberg (2009) is clear on this point;
“educating political emotions would require that students learn to
distinguish between emotions on behalf of themselves and
emotions on behalf of a political collective, i.e., on behalf of views
for the social order” (p. 276). What the two scholars seem to
disagree on is how person-oriented emotions should be handled or
avoided. Englund (2016) argues that the teacher and the students
should jointly and interactively control person-oriented emotions/
passions, whereas Ruitenberg argues that students need to learn to
distinguish between their political emotions and their moral
emotions:
The emotions relevant to political education are not those associated
with a personal sense of entitlement or with a collective based on an
essentialist conception of identity, but rather emotions on behalf of a
political collective, associated with views of particular hegemonic
social relations. (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 277)

This implies that the emotions that are supported by the agonistic
approach are directed away from personal issues and are instead
directed toward social issues and bound up with collective
identities.
However, even though Ruitenberg’s distinction answers the
deliberative critique, it is still problematic. We could ask whether it
is reasonable to hold a position that requires students to decide if
their emotion qualifies as a political or a moral emotion. Such an
understanding places emotions in a rather strong rationalistic
framework. I have elsewhere argued that a definition of political
emotions that takes it starting point in which object the emotion is
directed towards is a problematic way of discerning whether it is a
political emotion or not (Tryggvason, 2017).
From an agonistic perspective, a point of departure for
defining political emotions could instead be found in the agonistic
notion of the political as an articulated and contingent distinction
between “us” and “them”. If emotions in this sense are bound up
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

with the question of collective identities, in which what I feel is
inseparable from who I am (see Boler, 1999), then political emotions, in terms of being emotions that are directed toward social
and political issues, can be seen as something that binds the
identity to the political issue. In relation to the previous section,
this conception of political emotions makes it difficult to sustain
the sharp distinction between identity and issue that the
deliberative theory rests on in its critique of agonism.
Still, even if the role of political emotions in classrooms could
be further emphasized, it does not mean that all political emotions
should be seen as relevant in a democratic citizenship education. In
theorizing agonistic emotions, Mihai (2014) stresses that emotions
that are relevant for democracy “must not violate certain rules of
engagement with the different other, the very rules that undergird
a democratic ethos and that make agonism possible” (p. 40). For a
societal institution, such as education, an important task is to
enable political emotions that are within the ethico-political values
of democracy (Sund & Öhman, 2014, p. 653–654; see also Mihai,
2014, p. 44).
Emotions in themselves are therefore not as problematic from
the agonistic perspective. However, they do become problematic or
irrelevant if they are directed toward the personal lives of other
students, or if their political content is antagonistic or antidemocratically oriented (Mihai, 2014, p. 45). Thus, I argue that the
agonistic notion of political emotions that are relevant in classroom discussions coincides with Englund’s notion of commitment.
However, where Englund has advocated commitment, as opposed
to indifference, an agonistic approach would be to understand this
in terms of emotions, such as political hope instead of political
resentment (see Mihai, 2014).
Given the agonistic understanding of how the political
dimension of emotions is bound up with collective identities and
the boundaries between “us” and “them,” emotions cannot be
“brought into” political discussions. If the discussion truly is
political, then the emotions are already there. The main question
that the deliberative critique points to is therefore not whether
emotions should be brought into the discussions or not, but rather:
How can emotions that revolve along the line between “us” and
“them,” in ways that are compatible with the ethico-political values
of liberty and equality, be given the possibility to flourish in the
classroom? In other words, how can the lines between different
visions of liberty and equality, and the emotions bound up with
these, be continuously drawn and redrawn within education?

The Problems with Assimilating Agonism with Deliberation
Against the background of the above sections, we could ask
whether agonism and deliberative theory can be assimilated in a
fruitful way. Some similarities can be identified between agonism
and deliberation, such as the joint critique of essentialist identities and person-oriented emotions within education, which could
indicate a fruitful assimilation between them. However, in the
following, I argue that the attempt to assimilate agonism with
deliberation in citizenship education cannot be successful if the
notion of agonism stems from Mouffe’s theory of agonistic
pluralism. Drawing on previous debates in the field of political
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theory, Mouffe’s agonism appears to be incompatible with the
central assumptions of deliberative theory. Instead, I argue that an
assimilation of this kind would have to be based on other notions
and definitions of agonism if it is to be successful.
In the field of political theory, several different ideas about
how agonism and deliberation could be integrated have been put
forward (Jezierska, 2011; Khan, 2013; Knops, 2007; Markell, 1997).
The political theorist Gürsözlü (2009) has pointed out that
attempts to assimilate agonistic theory with deliberative theory can
either be seen as a strategy to formulate deliberation as agonism, or
to formulate agonism as deliberation. The former strategy stresses
the agonistic and conflictual aspects of deliberative theory (e.g.,
Knops, 2007), while the latter emphasizes that agonistic theory is
dependent on an idea of consensus and collective will-formation
(e.g., Erman, 2009). In the following, the discussion is limited to
the formulation of deliberation as agonism, because this strategy
has been put forward in the field of citizenship education.
In the strategy of formulating deliberation as agonism,
agonistic struggles are regarded as a component that is handled by
deliberation. Hence, deliberation is already seen as agonistic in its
characteristics in that it takes its starting point in the conflict. As
Gürsözlü (2009) expresses it, it is an idea that “discursive politics
does not only tolerate agonistic political action but also requires it”
(p. 362). The difference from a deliberative perspective is that
deliberative theory places an ideal to move beyond the point of
agonistic struggles. Agonistic theory lacks such an ideal. However,
the strategy to assimilate agonism with deliberative theory is
problematic. In his critique of Markell’s (1997) attempt to assimilate
agonism with deliberation, Gürsözlü (2009) shows that the
approach to equate the agonistic notion of conflict with the
deliberative notion of conflict would result in a “tamed version” of
agonism, where antagonism as a constituent of agonism is overlooked (p. 364).
In the field of education, the strategy of formulating deliberation as agonism can be identified in Englund’s (2016) idea of seeing
“agonism as a link to deliberation” (p. 70). The starting point for
this line of reasoning is that agonism is seen as an attempt to
overcome antagonism, because it is a transformation of antagonistic struggles between deadly enemies into democratic struggles
between political adversaries. From Englund’s deliberative
perspective, a reasonable question is why citizenship education
should settle with agonism as an end, when it can aim towards
deliberative ideals. Englund emphasizes that some form of conflict
constitutes a necessary precondition for deliberation. Accordingly,
an agonistic conflict can therefore be a first step and a precondition
for the second step, which is deliberation. From this perspective,
deliberation is understood as both a qualification and a transformation of agonistic struggles into a communicative situation that
starts with a conflict but does not place the conflict as the end
point. In this sense, deliberation is already incorporating the
conflictual aspects emphasized by agonistic theory while at
the same time aiming to overcome them. In short, deliberation is
seen as being agonistic because it stems from a conflict, although it
differs from agonism in its normative aim to reach beyond the
conflict. Returning to the field of political theory, Gürsözlü’s
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

critique of Markell seems to be applicable to this educational idea
of formulating “agonism as a link to deliberation.” In my view, there
are two main reasons as to why the idea of agonism as a link to
deliberation is not compatible with Mouffe’s theory of agonism.
Following Gürsözlü, such an approach needs to be based on a
“tamed version” of agonism if it is to be successful.
First, the idea of seeing agonism as a link to deliberation and
the ambition to overcome the adversarial relation rests on the
assumption that antagonism can be eradicated. This assimilative
attempt does not take into account that agonism is not a relation
where antagonism is overcome, but a relation where antagonism is
merely sublimated. One of Mouffe’s central arguments is that if
there is no room for agonistic conflicts, then there is an overarching
risk that conflicts will become antagonistic: “My argument is that,
when the channels are not available through which conflicts could
take an ‘agonistic’ form, those conflicts tend to emerge on the
antagonistic mode” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 5). If agonism would be
transformed into deliberation, conflicts could “emerge on
the antagonistic mode.” Consequently, an attempt to overcome
agonistic conflicts and transform them into deliberation presupposes that antagonism could be eradicated. Such a proposal is at
direct odds with Mouffe’s conception of agonism, which becomes
clear in Mouffe’s formulation of the difference between her own
theoretical position, which is grounded in Carl Schmitt and that of
other agonistic scholars who draw on the works of Hannah Arendt
and Friedrich Nietzsche:1 “[W]hat you have is ‘agonism without
antagonism, whilst my position is ‘agonism with antagonism.’ My
understanding of agonistic relation is that it is sublimated antagonism” (Mouffe, cited in Dreyer Hansen & Sonnichsen, 2014,
p. 268).
This implies that even if a conflict is a precondition for
deliberation, and agonism is a conflict between “friendly enemies”
(Mouffe, 2000, p. 13), it does not mean that agonism can easily
function as a precondition for deliberation. The agonistic notion
of conflict clearly seems to differ from the deliberative notion of
conflict. In Mouffe’s (2005) theory, antagonism is an ontological
concept, while the deliberative notion of conflict is an ontic concept.
As Mouffe formulates it, the agonistic conflict between adversaries
is a sublimation of antagonism and never an eradication of
antagonism. In contrast to this, in the deliberative perspective put
forward by Englund, the notion of conflict designates a phenomenon that theoretically can be overcome, at least temporarily.
Whether the conflict is overcome or not and consensus is achieved
is, from the deliberative perspective, ultimately seen as an empirical question (see Englund, 2016, p. 66). The deliberative notion of
conflict therefore clearly differs from the agonistic theory of
antagonism as an ontological condition for human societies
(Mouffe, 2005, p. 19). Thus, to successfully assimilate agonism with
deliberation, an “agonism without antagonism” seem to be what is
needed, rather than the notion of agonism that Mouffe formulates.
Second, if a rational consensus is, at least theoretically,
conceivable, it implies that the agonistic idea of how collective
1 Mouffe mentions Bonnie Honig as an agonistic scholar inspired by
Hannah Arendt and William Connolly as a Nietzsche-inspired agonistic
scholar (Dreyer Hansen & Sonnichsen, 2014).
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identities always constitute an outside is incorrect (see Mouffe,
2005, pp. 14–19). Thus, the idea that there is no need to settle with
agonism because a rational consensus is achievable implies that
politics without adversaries is possible. If there is a possibility to
create political unity through open and rational deliberation,
without creating an outside consisting of “others,” then very little is
left of Mouffe’s agonistic theory. The attempt to assimilate agonism
with deliberation therefore seems to ignore a core assumption in
the agonistic theory, namely that an all-inclusive political consensus is ultimately a contradiction. Given the Schmittian notion of
the political as the distinction between “us” and “them,” which
is the starting point for Mouffe’s (2005) agonistic theory, an
all-inclusive political consensus is not possible to achieve. If it is
an all-inclusive consensus, then it cannot be a political consensus.
Moreover, if it is a political consensus, it cannot be all-inclusive.
The critic could here point to how Mouffe’s agonistic theory is
based on a conception of consensus in its idea of transforming the
enemy into an adversary (e.g., Erman, 2009). However, when
Mouffe (1999, p. 756) puts forward the need for a “conflictual
consensus” on the ethico-political values of democracy, it is not an
attempt to reach an all-inclusive consensus. Rather, as Gürsözlü
(2009) has made clear, it aims for a constitution of hegemony: “As,
such, for Mouffe, what consensus around liberal-democratic values
means is the constitution of a hegemony not the elimination of it”
(p. 359).
To sum up, if agonism is to be successfully assimilated with
deliberation and seen as the first step toward deliberation, then
Mouffe’s agonistic theory needs to be put aside and other more
“tamed” notions of agonism put forward (see Gürsözlü, 2009,
p. 364).

Conclusion
In this paper I argue that the deliberative critique of the agonistic
approach to citizenship education is based on a misreading of
the main concepts in agonistic theory. The argument is that the
deliberative critique erroneously claims that agonism tends to
emphasize essentialist identities in education, something which
could add fuel to conflicts between persons rather than between
political issues and perspectives.
Returning to the question of which principles should be the
main ones for political discussions in the classroom, the agonistic
approach and the deliberative approach provide different answers.
From the agonistic perspective, a principle that summarizes the
approach is the acknowledgment of the political dimension in
emotions, identities, and conflicts. With this principle in the
foreground, the agonistic approach highlights the intimate
interplay between the political issue at stake and students’ identities and emotions when engaging in political discussions. From a
deliberative stance, the main principles for political discussions in
the classroom can be found in the procedural framework of
classroom communication and are the principle of enabling
diverse opinions, the principle of mutual respect between participants and the aim towards a collective will-formation (see Samuelsson, 2016).
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

This difference between agonism and deliberative theory stem
from their different theoretical and political roots (in Habermas
and Dewey on the one hand, and Mouffe on the other) and are
ultimately based on different conceptions about politics and
democracy. Thus, educating students to become active democratic
citizens could mean different things if the teacher takes an agonistic or a deliberative stance. With the contemporary challenges that
democratic societies face, the role of citizenship education cannot
be overestimated. How this citizenship education should take
shape and which principles should be put in the foreground when
students meet each other in political discussion are questions that
need to be further discussed.
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